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The famous nineteenth-century psycho-
physicist Gustav Fechner was also a poet
and art critic. Armed with the tools of
science, Fechner sought to reconcile his
various interests. He would doubtless be
interested by technological developments
in neuroscience that have revealed the
operations of neurons at cellular resolution
and have enabled us to peer almost
unnoticed into each other’s working
brains. But can these tools advance our
understanding of aesthetics beyond Fech-
ner’s insights [1]? The nascent field of
neuroaesthetics claims it can. Here we
consider what questions this new field is
poised to answer. We underscore the
importance of distinguishing between
beauty, art, and perception—terms often
conflated by ‘‘aesthetics’’—and identify
adjacent fields of neuroscience such as
sensation, perception, attention, reward,
learning, memory, emotions, and decision
making, where discoveries will likely be
informative.
Aesthetics and Neuroscience
Aesthetics has a complex history. The
term derives from the Greek ‘‘perception’’
and was coined by Alexander Baumgarten
in 1750 as the study of sensory knowledge.
But following Immanuel Kant’s Critique of
Judgment in 1790 [2], aesthetics began
focusing on the concept of beauty, in
nature and in art. During the nineteenth
century, the term became largely synony-
mous with the philosophy of art. These
three connotations—perception, beauty,
art—point in different directions but are
often conflated in neuroaesthetics.
Kant is a preferred philosopher among
neuroaestheticians, no doubt because of
his towering stature in the history of
Western thought. He pursued a universal-
ist approach to beauty, an appealing
concept for neuroscientists because it
suggests a discrete neural basis. But Kant’s
concept of beauty has been severely
criticized in light of the prevailing plural-
ism of artistic styles. To make matters
more complicated, there is no consensus
on the nature of beauty. Kant’s under-
standing of beauty was predicated on an
attitude of ‘‘disinterested contemplation’’
[2], whereas Friedrich Nietzsche roundly
dismissed this notion and underlined the
impact of sensual attraction [3]. For the
poet John Keats, beauty equaled truth [4],
while Stendhal, the French novelist, char-
acterized beauty as the ‘‘promise of
happiness’’ [5]. More recently, Elaine
Scarry described beauty as an urge to
repeat [6]. While each of these theories is
respected, not one is universally accepted.
Partly this diversity of opinions is connect-
ed to the different functions that beauty
holds within various philosophical systems,
being sometimes viewed in connection
with epistemology or with ethics. One
goal of neuroaesthetics is to get to the
bottom of the problem of artistic beauty.
How can this be accomplished?
Experiences of beauty are often deeply
moving, and their importance to the
human condition invites a neuroscientific
explanation. But while deep emotional
reactions are often associated with beauty,
being moved does not always indicate an
instance of beauty. Consider hearing
about a disaster, celebrating a sports
victory, or smelling a long-forgotten scent.
These experiences are better described as
‘‘sympathy,’’ ‘‘elation,’’ and ‘‘memory,’’
rather than experiences of beauty. If
neuroaesthetics is to be concerned specif-
ically with beauty, it must draw distinc-
tions between mechanisms for such dispa-
rate reactions. Since many experiences of
beauty are related to art, neuroaestheti-
cians have focused their attention on the
analysis of artworks. For example, Rama-
chanran [7], Zeki [8], and Kandel [9]
have presented case studies focusing on
classical Indian art, American and Euro-
pean modernists, and the Viennese Seces-
sionists. Explicitly or implicitly, these
studies aim to extract rules that would
lead to a practical definition of beauty,
connecting features of objects and neural
activity. Zeki, for instance, argues that the
power of Alexander Calder’s sculptures
derives from the black-and-white moving
parts, potent activators of the brain’s
motion-processing center.
It may be no coincidence that the art
these three authors hold up relates to the
culture in which they were each raised.
One potential danger in aesthetic projects
is to universalize one’s subjective convic-
tions and assume that an experience of
beauty is common to all. Projecting from
individual subjective experience is decep-
tive, for there is ample evidence that
notions of beauty vary between cultures
and are mutable even within a culture—
just think of fast-changing trends in fashion.
Moreover, the equation (art=beauty) rests
on shaky ground. Throughout history,
artists have created deeply moving art-
work that is emphatically not beautiful;
Goya’s Saturn Devouring One of His Sons
(Figure 1) provides a famous historical
example. Large swaths of twentieth-
century art have greatly expanded—or
entirely disavowed—notions of beauty.
Such distinctions may seem picky, but
interdisciplinary work such as neuroaes-
thetics relies on shared principles, and
requires heightened attention to concep-
tual clarity.
Essays articulate a specific perspective on a topic of
broad interest to scientists.
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outlining how sensory signals are pro-
cessed by the nervous system to yield
behavior [10,11]. Signals from sensory
epithelia such as the retina or basilar
membrane are processed in the cerebral
cortex by a series of areas that compute
descriptions of the world: what or where
objects are. These brain areas send signals
to other brain structures that are respon-
sible for evaluating options against expect-
ed rewards—attaching significance to the
sensory descriptions—and ultimately for
making decisions, guided by learning,
memory, and emotions. Below we argue
that a successful neuroaesthetics will
include the study of each of these stages
of processing as they relate to handling,
encoding, and generating aesthetic expe-
riences, rather than an attempt to derive a
single universal neural underpinning of
what constitutes beauty.
First Steps in Neuroaesthetics:
Sensation, Perception, and Art
One approach commonly included
under the umbrella of neuroaesthetics
involves examining art objects in muse-
ums. Here the complication of establishing
‘‘beauty’’ is obviated by treating artworks
as products of a massive empirical exper-
iment. By analogy with evolutionary
theory, the assumption is that the tiny
number of works that survive the selective
pressures exerted by collectors, cultural
institutions, and fads are enriched for the
strength of their effects on the nervous
system. Using this approach, studies have
uncovered various artistic strategies re-
flecting fundamental operations of the
neural mechanisms for sensation and
perception [7,8,12–14]. For example, de-
pictions of shadows in paintings often do
not correspond to the light sources that
cause them [15]. Such unnoticed devia-
tions from veracity reveal important ad-
aptations of the brain to ecological pres-
sures during evolution and development—
in the case of shadows, the relationship of
objects to light sources is in flux and
therefore not a stable feature. Similarly,
analysis of portraits has been insightful,
showing that the outer contour of a face is
more important for face recognition than
the precise configuration of features [16].
And paintings by Paul Cezanne, Henri
Matisse, and Claude Monet show how
these artists capitalized upon the neural
mechanisms of color [17]. This line of
research is often described as the neuro-
science of art, rather than neuroaesthetics,
since it does not test for beauty [13]. The
approach may reveal the perceptually
Figure 1. Goya y Lucientes, Francisco de, Saturn devouring one of his sons (1821–1823).
Mural transferred to canvas. 143.5 cm681.4 cm. Museo del Prado, Madrid.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001504.g001
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contributing to aesthetics as Baumgarten
defined it—but these properties are nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient features of
beautiful objects. An Alexander Calder
sculpture may consist of optimal stimuli
for the brain’s motion center, but this
aspect of the work does not make it
beautiful. The art simply provides a
fascinating demonstration of the compu-
tations of the brain’s motion-perception
circuits, and the genius of the artists for
discovering them.
It is an open question whether an
analysis of artworks, no matter how
celebrated, will yield universal principles
of beauty. Compositional principles such
as the golden ratio are intriguing possible
universals, and captured the attention of
Fechner, but despite mathematical appeal,
the golden rectangle is not the favorite
rectangle shape of most people [18]. One
possible almost-universal may be the
appeal of certain female facial features
(symmetry, high cheekbones, large eyes)
and a 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio [19] or high
body mass index [20]. Explanations for
these preferences depend on a correlation
between the attributes and reproductive
fitness. Yet celebrated representations of
female beauty across history can deviate
considerably from the 0.7 rule, and ratio
preferences vary across cultures [21,22].
Depictions of reproductive fitness can be
sexually appealing and contribute to
aesthetic appeal, but such depictions are,
again, neither necessary nor sufficient for
beauty. Another possible universal con-
cerns the intriguing discovery that painters
typically center one eye along the hori-
zontal axis of a picture [23], taken to
indicate ‘‘hidden principles…operating in
our aesthetic judgments.’’ But the trend
towards eye-centering has declined dra-
matically during and after avant-garde
movements such as those led by Picasso
[13]. Whether this decline is attributable
to the relative decline of beauty as a
driving force in artistic creation or indi-
cates a cultural shift in aesthetic prefer-
ences is unclear. Using celebrated works as
empirical data to understand beauty might
be a worthwhile gambit, but we doubt that
conclusions can be extended across peo-
ples, times, and cultures. The only univer-
sal feature of beauty besides our capacity
to experience it appears to be its mutabil-
ity, itself perhaps a topic for neuroscience.
A Beauty Center?
Fechner was well aware of the pitfalls of
philosophical aesthetics and aimed to
reformulate the field ‘‘from the ground
up.’’ His appreciation of the inherently
subjective nature of beauty led him to start
with feelings of pleasure and displeasure
elicited by art, since these constituted for
him the bottom line beyond which further
analysis was impossible. Contemporary
neuroscience has gone much further. A
recent study claims that ‘‘all works that
appear beautiful to a subject have a single
brain-based characteristic, which is that
they have as a correlate of experiencing
them a change in strength of [fMRI]
activity within the mOFC [medial orbito-
frontal cortex]’’ [24]. Leaving aside meth-
odological challenges [25,26], is such a
correlation meaningful to understanding
aesthetics?
Subjectivist studies such as these over-
come the difficulty of defining beauty by
asking the participants to first rate visual
objects or sounds [24,27]. Brain activity
of each subject is then assessed to their
own set of ‘‘beautiful’’ versus ‘‘ugly’’
stimuli. Four experimental-design chal-
lenges surface. First, the options are
necessarily restricted, and might not in-
clude a truly beautiful choice—the study
design tests preferences, not beauty.
Second, different subjects likely interpret
the instructions in radically different ways.
Third, the use of different stimulus sets in
different subjects makes it difficult to
control for differences in low-level stimu-
lus features, which likely drive different
patterns of neural activity. And fourth,
the experiment requires that a given
object retain a fixed preferred status,
and one that is not modulated by context,
which we know is unlikely. As Fechner
showed, mere exposure changes judg-
ments of preference in favor of the
familiar option. Brandishing fMRI does
not circumvent these problems. More-
over, fMRI has cripplingly low spatial and
temporal resolution, and the relationship
between the measured signal and under-
lying neural activity is indirect. In addi-
tion, fMRI experiments often only report
regions that show differential activation
between pairs of conditions (e.g., response
to beautiful greater than response to ugly);
such an analysis is misleading in situations
in which all brain regions show significant
but slightly different levels of activity for
the different conditions, as is likely the
case in considerations of beauty. Brain
imaging provides a blurry, although
seductively glossy, view of brain function.
And by finessing a definition of beauty,
these sorts of studies sidestep what is at
the heart of our interest in beauty: the
connection between physical stimuli, spe-
cifically those crafted by human hands,
and our response.
Nonetheless, a discovery that every
person’s experience of beauty (however
vaguely defined) correlates with activity
within a specific brain region would be
surprising, since it would seem more likely
that a complex reaction (beautiful!) would
hinge not on the absolute level of activity
within a single brain center but rather on
the pattern of activity across many distrib-
uted brain regions—specifically those re-
sponsible for perception, reward, decision
making, and emotion. Indeed, a broader
reading of the literature reveals that the
mOFC is not uniquely associated with
experiences of beauty and may be neither
necessary nor sufficient for these experi-
ences. The mOFC appears to be part of a
large network of brain regions that sub-
serves all value judgments. For example,
elevated activity within the mOFC is
reported in studies of neuroeconomics in
which subjects are asked to assign value to
a selection of choices and are never asked
to consider the beauty of the choices
[11,28–30]. The mOFC has also been
implicated in impulse control and self-
regulation [31], in changing decision
thresholds that influence whether infor-
mation should be expressed in an evalu-
ation [32], in attentional processes that
underlie emotion-congruent judgment
[33], and in moral decision making [34].
Ascribing responses of the mOFC to
experiences of beauty is premature; many
experiences depend on these processes
without being beautiful [27,35–38].
If the mOFC plays a critical role in
mediating beauty, one might expect that
strokes of the region would impair expe-
riences of beauty. Strokes of the mOFC
are rare, but the limited evidence suggests
they affect self-related systems such as self-
evaluation [39,40] and do not impact a
person’s ability to experience beauty.
Alternatively, strokes in other brain re-
gions can, paradoxically, enhance creativ-
ity, providing support for the notion that
the expression of beauty depends on a
broad, distributed network. Frontotempo-
ral dementia can produce an acquired
obsessiveness that is often linked to
enhanced art production, usually of ex-
tremely detailed works [41]. In addition,
strokes of the left hemisphere, which often




Inspired by the power of polling, in 1994
a pair of artists, Komar and Melamid, set
out to determine ‘‘USA’s most wanted
painting.’’ The painting was formulated on
PLOS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 3 March 2013 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | e1001504the basis of a thousand people’s responses
to questions of their favorite color, favorite
setting, and favorite subjects. The resulting
painting is absurd, showing that a compo-
sition with everything that people find
beautiful does not make a beautiful paint-
ing. Rational reductionist approaches to
the neural basis for beauty run a similar risk
of pushing the round block of beauty into
the square hole of science and may well
distill out the very thing one wants to
understand. There is a popular conception
of beauty as a fixed attribute of objects, a
notion that much of current neuroaes-
thetics depends upon. But there is a
distinction between abstract notions of
beauty and our experience of it—consider
a specific example in which you have
experienced beauty. Beauty is an analog,
notbinary, conditionthat variesincomplex
ways with exposure, context, attention, and
rest—as do most perceptual responses. In
trying to crack the subjective beauty nut
with scientific, objective information, we
also run the risk of fueling a normative,
possibly dangerous campaign through
which science is required to valorize our
experience. Should we deny someone’s
experience of beauty if the mOFC is not
activated? Obviously not. But the question
underscores the danger of reverse infer-
ence, a technique used in brain-imaging
studies which posits that activation of a
brain region indicates the presence of a
stimulus [43]. Reverse inference is almost
always invalid because single brain struc-
tures almost never regulate single specific
experiences.
Insofar as beauty is a product of the
brain, correlations between brain activity
and experiences of beauty must exist. At
what spatial scale, and within what brain
regions, do we find these correlations?
What functions do the brain regions
implicated serve in other behaviors? What
signals during development and experi-
ence are responsible for wiring up these
circuits? And perhaps most critically, how
does the activity of these circuits integrate
across modalities and time to bring about
the dynamic, elusive quality of beauty? To
address these questions, the field is thirsty
for carefully conducted experiments that
distinguish responses to beauty from those
involved in more general value-based
decision tasks such as self-evaluation or
selecting a juice for lunch. But any such
experiments are caught on the same
stubborn thorn—the lack of a cogent,
universally accepted definition of beauty.
One should not always demand a precise
definition to make headway, but it might
turn out that the philosophers’ disagree-
ment is symptomatic: maybe there is no
universal concept beyond the human
capacity to experience beauty. Our cau-
tion about neuroscience’s focus on beauty
differs from the skepticism that attended
scientific study of other subjective phe-
nomena such as illusory contours (or even
consciousness); in the case of illusory
contours, the subjective experience to a
given physical stimulus is universal. So,
what is neuroaesthetics supposed to study?
Experiences of beauty typically require
attention and are accompanied by feelings
of pleasure [11,27,44]. In the same way
that basic studies at the interface of
sensory neuroscience and art have been
productive—not in addressing why art
objects are beautiful but in uncovering
the strategies that artists use to generate
artwork—basic investigations of the mech-
anisms of attention, decision making,
reward, and emotion [11,28,29,45–47]
could inform neuroaesthetics. The field
will benefit from developing models relat-
ing observations from the humanities to
the careful neuroscience that has uncov-
ered computations at cellular resolution
within the value-judging structures of the
monkey brain. These structures, not
coincidentally, are analogous to those
identified in fMRI studies of beauty in
humans. Some neurons within these
structures encode the value of the choices
on offer, while others encode the value of
the selected choice. Moreover, the neurons
adapt on different timescales, displaying
‘‘menu-invariant’’ firing at short timescales
and adaptable behavior on longer time-
scales. This adaptation may account for
our ability to make choices across vastly
different scales, for example from a
restaurant menu in one instance and from
houses offered for sale in the next instance
[48]. It seems entirely reasonable—even
likely—that these neurons are also impli-
cated in the thorny task of deciding what is
beautiful. Reformulated in this way, neu-
roaesthetics is decoupled from beauty and
can exploit advances across a range of
empirical neuroscience, from sensory en-
coding to decision making and reward.
There may well be a ‘‘beauty instinct’’
implemented by dedicated neural machin-
ery capable of producing a diversity of
beauty reactions, much as there is lan-
guage circuitry that can support a multi-
tude of languages (and other operations).
A need to experience beauty may be
universal, but the manifestation of what
constitutes beauty certainly is not. On the
one hand, a neuroaesthetics that extrapo-
lates from an analysis of a few great works,
or one that generalizes from a single
specific instance of beauty, runs the risk
of missing the mark. On the other, a
neuroaesthetics comprising entirely sub-
jectivist accounts may lose sight of what is
specific to encounters with art. Neuroaes-
thetics has a great deal to offer the
scientific community and general public.
Its progress in uncovering a beauty
instinct, if it exists, may be accelerated if
the field were to abandon a pursuit of
beauty per se and focus instead on
uncovering the relevant mechanisms of
decision making and reward and the basis
for subjective preferences, much as Fech-
ner counseled. This would mark a return
to a pursuit of the mechanisms underlying
sensory knowledge: the original concep-
tion of aesthetics.
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